

**58TH ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE ALABAMA PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY**



September 29-30, 2023
Hilton Pensacola Beach Gulf Front
12 Via Luna Drive
Pensacola, Florida 32561

**58TH ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE ALABAMA PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY**

Keynote Speaker

Richard Fumerton
University of Iowa

President

Ted Poston
University of Alabama

Vice President

Samuel Baker
South Alabama University

Secretary-Treasurer

Tim Butzer
Alabama A&M University

Web Site

<http://alphilsoc.org>

Registration

TBD

Friday September 29th (Morning)**8:00-8:45**

Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4
Subconscious Inference and Perceptual Justification <i>Kaleena Stoddard (Tulane University)</i>	Anscombe's Essentialist Metaphysics of Action: An Exposition and Defense <i>Armand Babakhanian (Georgia State University)</i>	Where is the Value in Health? <i>David Merli (Franklin and Marshall College) and Cruz Davis (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)</i>	Taking a New Plunge: Reconsidering Austin's Parallel Between Saying "I know..." and Saying "I promise" <i>William Melanson (University of Nebraska-Omaha)</i>

8:50-9:35

Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4
Radical Skepticism, Metaphysical Possibility, and Non-Uniformism in Modal Epistemology <i>Howard Liu (University of Miami)</i>	Title TBA <i>Trevor Griffith (Tulane University)</i>	The Duty to Avoid Preventable Bad Health <i>J. Joseph Porter (DePauw University)</i>	Aristotle's Determination of the Human Work (<i>Ergon</i>): <i>Nicomachean Ethics</i> I 7, 1097b33-1098a7 <i>Samuel Baker (University of South Alabama)</i>

9:40-10:25

Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4
Truth, Justice, and Charitable Interpretation <i>Joshua Smith (Central Michigan University)</i>	Narrative as Assertion <i>Victoria Isett (Georgia State University)</i>	Police Interrogation and Fraudulent Epistemic Environments <i>Luke Hunt (University of Alabama)</i>	Hobbes, Power, and Elitism <i>T. Allan Hillman (University of South Alabama)</i>

10:30-11:15

Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4
Outsourcing Inquiry <i>Jonathan Matheson (University of North Florida)</i>	Harm and Obligation in Parasocial Relationships <i>Kayla Bohannon (University of North Alabama)</i>	Plato, Participatory Arts, and Moral Education <i>Nick Smith (Alabama A&M University)</i>	A Tale of Two Theses: The Good of Others and Stoic Self-Sufficiency <i>Allison Piñeros Glasscock (Georgia State University)</i>

11:20-12:05

Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4
Hyperintensional Evidence and Bayesian Coherence <i>Ted Poston (University of Alabama)</i>	Particularism About Personal Identity <i>Joungbin Lim (Troy University)</i>	Police Interrogation and Fraudulent Epistemic Environments <i>Luke Hunt (University of Alabama)</i>	Aristotle on the Intellect De Anima III.4-5 <i>Dessire Lopez Jimenez (Georgia State University)</i>

Lunch (12:05-1:15)

Friday September 29th (Afternoon)

1:15-2:00

Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4
UNDERGRADUATE AWARD WINNER- A Commentary on Sex Objects and Sexy Subjects: A Feminist Reclamation of Sexiness <i>Maggie Nelson (Auburn University)</i>	Truth, Power, and Justice <i>Aaron Griffith (College of William and Mary)</i>	A Defense of Reductarianism <i>Josh May (University of Alabama-Birmingham)</i>	Rethinking the Debate between Realists and Anti-realists <i>Adam Podlaskowski (Fairmont State University)</i>

Program for the 58th Annual Meeting of the Alabama Philosophical Society

2:05-2:50

Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4
Autism, Schizophrenia and Predictive Processing: Some Externalist Implications for Perceptual Epistemology <i>Tim Butzer (Alabama A&M University)</i>	Emergent Organic Meaning: A New Species of Group Expression? <i>Andrew Morgan (Birmingham Southern College) and Ralph DiFranco (University of South Dakota)</i>	The Aesthetic Value of Food <i>Guy Rohrbaugh (Auburn University)</i>	God is Not a Consequentialist <i>Omar Fahkri (Bethel Univeristy)</i>

2:55-4:30 (Two Sessions)

	Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4
2:55-3:40	Social Epistemology and Epidemiology <i>Ben W. McCraw (Upstate University of South Carolina)</i>	Considering Normative Individualism in the Context of Group Silencing <i>David Spewak (Marion Military Institute)</i>	The Relevance of Knowledge in Sport <i>Brett Coppenger (Tuskegee University)</i>	AUTHOR MEETS CRITICS SESSION 1 <u>The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism</u>
3:45-4:30	Permissible Dispute-Dependent Responses to Evidence <i>Derrick Baker (University of Illinois)</i>	Social Generics in Context <i>Rachel Rudolph (Auburn University)</i>	Paradox and Common Sense <i>Rodrigo Borges (University of Florida)</i>	AUTHOR: <i>Torin Alter (University of Alabama)</i> CRITICS: <i>Robert Howell (Rice University)</i> <i>Benedicte Veillet (University of Michigan-Flint)</i>

KEYNOTE ADDRESSFriday, September 29th, 4:45 P.M.- 6:15 P.M.

Location: TBD

Skeptical Scenarios and the Truth Conditions for Philosophical Claims

Richard Fumerton

University of Iowa

Saturday September 30th

8:30-9:15

Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4
On the Truthful Experience of a Friend <i>Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock (Georgia State University)</i>	What in the World Makes That Work? <i>Cruz Davis ((University of Massachusetts, Amherst)</i>	Consent and Humanitarian Military Intervention <i>Leonard Kahn (Loyola University)</i>	Lions, Angels, and Demons <i>CR Dodsworth (Spring Hill College)</i>

9:20-10:05

Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4
Gettier Problems as Intended-Method Failure <i>Jordan Scott (Rutgers University)</i>	In Defense of 'Harmful' and 'Dangerous' Inquiry in Philosophy <i>Eric Sampson (Purdue University) and Rebecca Tuvel (Rhodes College)</i>	Trust, Polarization, and Social Media <i>Timothy Aylsworth (Florida International University)</i>	Heterodoxy in Divine Explanations of Morality <i>Justin Morton (University of California-Davis) and Dan Kemp (Grand Canyon University)</i>

10:10-10:55

Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4
Intellectual Virtue and the Normativity of Logic <i>Robert Farley (Hillsborough Community College) and Deke Gould (Augustana College)</i>	Admirably Immoral Inquiry <i>Mike Veber (East Carolina University)</i>	A Defense of Non-Ideal Friendship <i>Janelle Gormley (University of Nebraska-Lincoln)</i>	The Shadow of Scepticism and Reasoning about Religion in Hume's Dialogues <i>Kevin Meeker (University of South Alabama)</i>

11:00-12:35 (Two Sessions)

	Room 1	Room 2	Room 3	Room 4
11:00-11:45	Moral Roles for Credence and for Belief <i>Alexandra Lloyd (University of Tampa)</i>	The Average Philosopher <i>Robert Gressis (California State University, Northridge)</i>	(What) is mental disorder? (What) do we want it to be? <i>Jennifer Gleason (University of Alabama)</i>	AUTHOR MEETS CRITICS SESSION 2 <u>Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind</u> AUTHOR: <i>Eric Marcus (Auburn University)</i>
11:50-12:35	Believing Rationally Given Your Actual Beliefs: On Susanna Rinard's Pragmatism <i>Marlon Tinoco (University of Oklahoma)</i>	A Buddhist Approach to Moral Knowledge Without God <i>Nicholaos Jones (University of Alabama-Huntsville)</i>	NO SESSION	CRITICS: <i>Jason Bridges (University of Chicago)</i> <i>Chris Blake-Turner (Oklahoma State University)</i>

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Friday, September 29th, 4:45 P.M.- 6:15 P.M.

Location: TBD

Welcome and Introduction

President of the Alabama Philosophical Society

Ted Poston

University of Alabama

Skeptical Scenarios and the Truth Conditions for Philosophical Claims

Richard Fumerton

University of Iowa

Abstract

We are all familiar with appeals to skeptical scenarios as an attempt to gain understanding into the truth conditions for claims about epistemic justification. In this paper I explore the possibility that a similar appeal to skeptical scenarios might allow us to gain important metaphilosophical insights into the truth conditions for philosophical claims more generally.

In Memoriam

Professor Stefan Forrester
University of Montevallo
1969-2023



Dr. Forrester was a long-time faculty member at the University of Montevallo where he served as an Associate Professor of Philosophy. Prior to his passing Prof. Forrester was scheduled to appear at this conference to present his paper entitled “Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s ‘Kantian’ Theory of the Imagination.” We have included the 1000-word abstract Prof. Forrester submitted for this paper beginning on the next page of this program.

The Alabama Philosophical Society extends its heartfelt condolences to the family, friends and loved ones of Prof. Forrester. A full obituary for Prof. Forrester can be found at the following web address:

www.charterfuneral.com/dr-stefan-steve-brent-forrester/

Samuel Taylor Coleridge's 'Kantean'¹ Theory of the Imagination

Stefan Forrester, *University of Montevallo*

"...why should'st thou remain
The only constant in a world of change
O yearning Thought! That liv'st but in the brain?"

--S.T. Coleridge, *Constancy to an Ideal Object*

In a letter to his nephew John Taylor Coleridge dated April 8th, 1825, S. T. Coleridge confesses that although he disagrees with much of Kant's philosophy (especially Kant's ethical theory), he still holds him in "highest honour" and that "...Immanuel Kant I assuredly do value most highly [among other philosophers]...."² Also, 8 years prior to this private letter, Coleridge publicly chronicled his immersion into Kant's philosophy, and the profound influence it had on him, in his own pseudo-philosophical work *Biographia Literaria*, published in 1817.³ In Chapter IX of that work Coleridge refers to Kant as "the illustrious sage of Königsberg" and asserts that the "clearness and evidence" of several of Kant's major works "took possession of me as with a giant's hand."⁴ So, what exactly did the 'giant's hand' of Kantian philosophy mold from Coleridge's malleable mind? Mapping out all of the probable lines of influence from Kant to Coleridge would be much too big of an undertaking for a short piece; however, a focused study of one very important line of influence would be manageable, and that is what I propose to do in the present essay.

More specifically, I will examine the imprint of Kantian thought on the brief and opaque account of the imagination that Coleridge sets out in Chapter XIII of his *Biographia*.⁵ And although the Kant-Coleridge connection has been explored in years past by several literary scholars, a more focused philosophical accounting of these connections, such as I undertake here, has only been attempted a handful of times. Moreover, my analysis will differ from most all prior ones in two key respects. Critique of Judgment the texts from Kant which interpreters usually bring to bear on Coleridge's views on imagination, such as selected passages from *Critique of Pure Reason* and the first part of *Critique of Judgment*, are too limited. Coleridge, as a talented and dedicated reader of Kant's works, brought more of Kant's ideas to the table (that have yet to be considered by commentators) when he put together his own theory of the imaginative faculty, including Kant's theory of *artistic genius* and his views on the *purposiveness of nature* from the often neglected second part of *Critique of Judgment*. Second, I claim that Coleridge believed Kant's theory of the imagination was

¹ *Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, Vol II, edited by Ernest Hartley Coleridge, William Heinemann Pub., London: 1895. Pg. 735. This idiosyncratic spelling of what is usually rendered as 'Kantian' is taken from the letter to J.T. Coleridge cited below.

² *Ibid.*, pg. 735.

³ *Biographia Literaria: Or Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and Opinions*, S. T. Coleridge. J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. Everyman's Library, London: 1906. All references to this work will be to this edition.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pg. 84. Coleridge is likely referencing the years 1801-2 in this passage when his study of Kant's works intensified,

⁵ Since Coleridge discussed his views on the imagination, both seriously and in passing, in many other places, e.g. his voluminous personal correspondence, I will not limit my analysis to just this one short passage in what follows.

essentially correct, though in need of some adjustment and enhancement, and well-suited to Coleridge's own purposes as a philosopher and literary critic. Thus, Coleridge, in my view, would have accepted that his own theory of the imagination was inspired heavily by the philosopher he held in the "highest honour" and so was also essentially a 'Kantian' theory.

The Philosophical Moment for Coleridge's Theory of Imagination

Since Coleridge's explicit writings on his theory of imagination are generally brief and underdeveloped, it is necessary to provide as robust a context as possible for his thoughts in order to help flesh them out. Luckily, in the *Biographia* Coleridge himself comments on the ideas of many of the philosophers (Kant and the German Idealists notwithstanding) he studied during his life. Within this group of thinkers are several of Coleridge's, as an Englishman, philosophical forebears in British empirical philosophy: such as Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Some previous discussions of Coleridge's imagination theory have cited his education in various forms of empiricism solely for the purposes of showing how he rejected that tradition in favor of the more modern waves of Kantianism and Idealism. I argue that this de-emphasis on Coleridge's philosophical roots in British Empiricism have left many past commentators with an incomplete grasp of how these philosophers' views still found their way into Coleridge's ideas on the imagination, especially as regards his definition of *fancy*. I will further explain and defend this claim after a brief explication of how imagination was defined and classified by each of the four empiricist thinkers mentioned above.

AUTHOR MEETS CRITICS SESSIONS

AUTHOR MEETS CRITICS SESSION 1

The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism

Oxford University Press (2023)

AUTHOR:

Torin Alter (University of Alabama)

CRITICS:

Robert Howell (Rice University)

Benedicte Veillet (University of Michigan-Flint)

BOOK SYNOPSIS (AMAZON): Torin Alter presents a compelling defense of the 'knowledge argument' against physicalism, pioneered by Frank Jackson. According to physicalism, consciousness is a physical phenomenon. The knowledge argument stars Mary, who learns all objective, physical information through black-and-white media and yet acquires new information when she first sees colors for herself: information about what it is like to see in color. Based partly on that case, Jackson concludes that not all information is physical. Alter argues that the knowledge argument succeeds in refuting all standard versions of physicalism: versions on which consciousness is grounded by what objective science reveals. Alter also argues that given further, plausible assumptions, the knowledge argument leads to Russellian monism, according to which there are intrinsic properties that both constitute consciousness and underlie properties described by physics, such as mass and charge. Alter explains how the knowledge argument establishes those two conclusions and defend it against numerous objections.

AUTHOR MEETS CRITICS SESSION 2

Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind

Oxford University Press (2021)

AUTHOR:

Eric Marcus (Auburn University)

CRITICS:

Jason Bridges (University of Chicago)

Chris Blake-Turner (Oklahoma State University)

BOOK SYNOPSIS (AMAZON): It is impossible to hold patently contradictory beliefs in mind together at once. Why? Because we know that it is impossible for both to be true. This impossibility is a species of rational necessity, a phenomenon that uniquely characterizes the relation between one person's beliefs. Here, Eric Marcus argues that the unity of the rational mind—what makes it one mind—is what explains why, given what we already believe, we can't believe certain things and must believe certain others in this special sense. What explains this is that beliefs, and the inferences by which we acquire them, are constituted by a particular kind of endorsement of those very states and acts. This, in turn, entails that belief and inference are essentially self-conscious: to hold a belief or to make an inference is at the same time to know that one does. An examination of the nature of belief and inference, in light of the phenomenon of rational necessity, reveals how the unity of the rational mind is a function of our knowledge of ourselves as bound to believe the true. Rational self-consciousness is the form of mental togetherness.

PRESENTATION ABSTRACTS FOR THE ALABAMA PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 2023 MEETING

(ABSTRACTS ORGANIZED ALPHABETICALLY BY AUTHOR)

“Trust Polarization and Social Media” *Timothy Aylsworth (Florida International University)*

There has been much discussion of the moral and prudential reasons we have to restructure our relationship with smartphones and social media. The literature on the harms associated with them encompasses a wide range of issues. But if we restrict our focus to the ways that technology can harm us as individuals, we overlook some morally significant harms to groups *qua* groups. In this paper, we argue that addictive technology weakens our capacity to act autonomously as a group agent. We show how certain components of the attention economy threaten to undermine the legitimacy of political institutions.

“Aristotle’s Determination of the Human Ergon” *Armand Babakhanian (Georgia State University)*

ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

“Permissible Dispute-Dependent Responses to Evidence” *Derrick Baker (University of Illinois)*

Many philosophers defend a principle of independence in which one is rationally required to "bracket off" one's beliefs about the matter in question and any of one's reasoning about the disputed question. However, I argue against this view of independence by defending two claims which contradict independence. The first claim is that it is rationally permissible for the fact of disagreement to be evidence in evaluating someone else's epistemic position. The second is that it is rationally permissible to interpret this evidence in a dispute-dependent way.

“Aristotle’s Determination of the Human Work (Ergon): Nicomachean Ethics I 7, 1097b33-1098a7” *Samuel Baker (University of South Alabama)*

In a foundational argument of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle offers a definition of the human good by reflecting on the nature of the human work (*ergon*). This is the “*ergon* argument” (aka “function argument”) of *NE* I 7. I here discuss that portion of the argument in which Aristotle determines what the human work is. I argue that the human work is a decided-upon activity of the intellect, and by extension a decided-upon activity of a lower power insofar as the lower power partakes of the intellect’s activity.

“Harm and Obligation in Parasocial Relationships” *Kayla Bohannon (University of North Alabama)*

This paper builds an account of the moral dimensions of parasocial relationships. I argue that these relationships can harm in both directions, when one party treats the other merely as a source of gain to which they are entitled. Insofar as parasocial relationships can harm in this way, those who participate in them have an obligation to avoid doing so. However, this obligation is merely general. Even if interpersonal relationships generate unique moral obligations, those obligations do not extend to parasocial relationships. Parasocial relationships are distinct from the interpersonal because the latter are mediated by the artist’s persona. Therefore, the illusory “intimacy” in such relationships cannot ground unique moral responsibilities.

“Paradox and Common Sense” *Rodrigo Borges (University of Florida)*

ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

“Autism, Schizophrenia and Predictive Processing: Some Externalist Implications for Perceptual Epistemology” *Tim Butzer (Alabama A&M University)*

Predictive Processing models of perception and cognition have been steadily gaining in relevance and popularity. In this paper I discuss potential implications of such views for the epistemology of perception. I briefly summarize key features of such models and then show they are used to explain cognitive features of autistic subjects as well as the delusions and hallucinations of subjects with schizophrenia. I then argue that these explanations, which turn on how the subjects’ cognitive systems weight the relative precision of sensory input, support a perceptual epistemology that relativizes evaluation of perceptual competence to the subject’s normal environmental conditions.

“The Relevance of Knowledge in Sport” *Brett Coppenger (Tuskegee University)*
ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

What in the World Makes That Work? *Cruz Davis ((University of Massachusetts, Amherst)*
ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

“Lions, Angels, and Demons” *C.R. Dodsworth (Spring Hill College)*
ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

“God is Not a Consequentialist” *Omar Fahkri (Bethel Univeristy)*

I argue that God is not a consequentialist. More specifically, I argue that relational theism—the type of theism that postulates a God that is in a deep and loving relationship with His creation—is incompatible with that God being a consequentialist. The argument is simple: if God is a consequentialist, then we cannot trust Him, and trust is required for a deep and loving relationship.

“Intellectual Virtue and the Normativity of Logic” *Robert Farley (Hillsborough Community College) and Deke Gould (Augustana College)*
We defend normativism—the view that logic provides regulative norms for thought—against two critics, Gillian Russell and Corine Besson. According to our opponents, logic is a descriptive subject that, like math/physics, acquires its normativity via field external norms. In reply, we note two asymmetries between logic and more obviously descriptive subjects. First, logic has a significantly greater breadth of scope. Second, it is a vice to be insouciant about the logical entailments of one’s beliefs, but not about math/physics facts. Ultimately, the latter asymmetry reveals that logic’s normativity arises from the fact that being logical is an epistemic virtue.

“(What) is Mental Disorder? (What) Do We Want It to Be?” *Jennifer Gleason (University of Alabama)*

In this paper I argue that we should revise our mental disorder concept so that it can be used as an effective tool in the fight against the stigmatization of persons with (real or perceived) mental health problems. With this in mind, I present a Haslangarian style argument for what this mental disorder concept should be given our goals. Finally, I analyze what sorts of people have mental disorders under this concept and what labeling these people as having a mental disorder does in terms of moving towards social justice for those with mental disorders.

Program for the 58th Annual Meeting of the Alabama Philosophical Society

“A Defense of Non-Ideal Friendship” *Janelle Gormley (University of Nebraska-Lincoln)*
 ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

“The Average Philosopher” *Robert Gressis (California State University, Northridge)*
 ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

“Truth, Power, and Justice” *Aaron Griffith (College of William and Mary)*

I begin by scrutinizing a popular sentiment that claims to truth are inherently oppressive or otherwise in the service of bolstering the power of certain groups and individuals. I reject the bald assertion that all claims to truth are oppressive. However, I go on to consider Foucault’s notion of a ‘regime of truth’ and draw from his account some important lessons about the production of social truth. The second half of the paper turns to making the case for the importance of social truth. I argue that social truth has its primary value in pointing us back to social reality. In this capacity, telling the truth about the social world, plays an important role in ‘speaking truth to power,’ social critique, and in efforts toward reconciliation and reparation.

Title TBA *Trevor Griffith (Tulane University)*
 ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

“Hobbes, Power, and Elitism” *T. Allan Hillman (University of South Alabama)*

Political scientists have long noted a theoretical affinity between Hobbes’s political philosophy and what has come to be known as elite theory, the view (to put it simply) that in any body politic there is, or can be, only a small class of persons who hold genuine power, that is, who exert the preponderance of social or political influence within a social collective (even if appearances are to the contrary). Philosophers, and historians of philosophy generally, have been markedly silent on the issue. As a member of the latter guild, I’ll stake my claim in this paper that the political scientists are on the whole correct.

“Police Interrogation and Fraudulent Epistemic Environments” *Luke Hunt (University of Alabama)*

It is generally necessary for the police to establish probable cause before engaging in custodial interrogation. Custodial police interrogation relies on a fraudulent epistemic environment (FEE). Probable cause is thus a sort of evidentiary and epistemic standard that legally justifies the police’s use of deceptive and dishonest custodial interrogation tactics that are on par with fraud. However, even if the use of an FEE is based on probable cause, norms regarding voluntariness, harm, legitimacy, and bargains—along with consequentialist concerns—support the conclusion that evidence with probative value (such as a confession) should often be excluded when derived from an FEE.

“Narrative as Assertion” *Victoria Isett (Georgia State University)*
 ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

“Aristotle on the Intellect De Anima III.4-5” *Dessire Lopez Jimenez (Georgia State University)*
 ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

Program for the 58th Annual Meeting of the Alabama Philosophical Society

“A Buddhist Approach to Moral Knowledge Without God” *Nicholaos Jones (University of Alabama-Huntsville)*

Suppose that there are moral truths, that many of these truths are independent of the attitudes anyone might have toward them, and that some humans have the ability to obtain largely accurate and complete beliefs about these truths. What best explains this ability, theism or naturalism? Some argue that theism does because neither evolutionary fitness nor social convention secure a connection between moral truths and human moral beliefs. I argue that the Buddhist tradition offers a naturalistic account of human moral knowledge that is no less plausible than accounts that posit the existence of a universe-creating intelligence.

“Consent and Humanitarian Military Intervention” *Leonard Kahn (Loyola University)*

A Humanitarian Military Intervention (HMI) occurs when one state or international organization uses military force to prevent the abuse of human rights within the sovereign territory of another state. HMIs generally happen without the consent of the state in which they occur. However, there is a long-standing consensus (associated with Kant, Mill, and Walzer) that the beneficiaries of the HMI must overwhelmingly consent to the intervention. I argue that there are circumstances in which consent from a small fraction of the beneficiaries is sufficient, if the intention of those intervening is to save them rather than benefit the larger group.

“Particularism about Personal Identity” *Joungbin Lim (Troy University)*

In contemporary literature on personal identity, philosophers have formulated a dilemma to challenge opposing theories of personal identity. However, I contend in this paper that this dilemma undermines their own theory of personal identity. Moreover, I argue that while there are instances where biological, bodily, or psychological continuity is sufficient for personal identity, none of these factors is what personal identity necessarily consists in. Consequently, no definitive criterion or universal principle can determine personal identity. This leads us to conclude that personal identity is contingent upon the particular circumstances where an individual persists through time.

“Radical Skepticism, Metaphysical Possibility, and Non-Uniformism in Modal Epistemology” *Howard Liu (University of Miami)*

ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

“Moral Roles for Credence and for Belief” *Alexandra Lloyd (University of Tampa)*

ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

“Outsourcing Inquiry” *Jonathan Matheson (University of North Florida)*

In this paper I offer two arguments for outsourcing your inquiry to someone else. The first is the argument from expertise. For nearly anything you want to think about, there is someone who is in a better epistemic position than you are. So, you are better off deferring to their judgment. The second argument is the argument from higher-order questions. For any question you want to answer, you could either think about it for yourself, or think about who you should outsource your inquiry to. For most questions, it will be easier to answer the higher-order question than it will be to answer the first-order question.

“A Defense of Reductarianism” *Josh May (University of Alabama-Birmingham)*

ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

“Where is the Value in Health?” *David Merli (Franklin and Marshall College) and Cruz Davis (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)*

ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

“Taking a New Plunge: Reconsidering Austin’s Parallel Between Saying “I know…” and Saying “I promise” *William Melanson (University of Nebraska-Omaha)*

In “Other Minds”, Austin famously drew a parallel between saying “I know…” and “I promise…” suggesting that saying “I know…” goes beyond mere assertion in much the same way that saying “I promise…” goes beyond simply stating an intention. As has been long recognized, Austin’s approach is deeply problematic as an analysis of *knowledge*. Nevertheless, as a window into the commitments undertaken in *knowledge attribution* and *mere assertion*, there is significant value in Austin’s proposed parallel. Ultimately, by reconsidering the parallel, we come to understand the sense in which saying “I know…” is “taking a new plunge” of commitment.

“Social Epistemology and Epidemiology” *Benjamin W. McCraw (Upstate University of South Carolina)*

Recent approaches to the social epistemology of belief formation have appealed to an epidemiological model. Alvin Goldman proposes an etiology of (social) beliefs, modelling them as diseases that infect people via some socio-epistemic community. This paper reconsiders Goldman’s epidemiological approach in terms of epistemic trust. By focusing on beliefs as diseases, Goldman misconstrues and underestimates the central role that epistemic trust plays in their formation (maintenance, revision, etc.). *Contra* Goldman, trust should be the center of an epidemiological model of social doxology—epistemic trust, rather than belief, is the disease with which one is infected.

“The Shadow of Scepticism and Reasoning about Religion in Hume's Dialogues” *Kevin Meeker (University of South Alabama)*

In this talk I’ll first provide a brief overview of the way most scholars think of the relationship between Hume’s epistemology in general and his discussion of religion in Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. After noting some puzzles about this approach, I’ll concentrate on a less controversial consensus that seems to be emerging about an important aspect of Hume’s epistemology. Focusing on this consensus will also allow us to read Hume’s Dialogues in a new light and also see how he anticipates certain aspects of contemporary debates about reasoning about the nature of logic in general and counterpossible reasoning more specifically.

“Emergent Organic Meaning: A New Species of Group Expression?” *Andrew Morgan (Birmingham Southern College) and Ralph DiFranco (University of South Dakota)*

Members of marginalized groups often report that collective and institutional behavior sends derogatory messages. For example, the disability rights critique’s classic argument against prenatal testing and selective abortion claims that these practices “express” ableist attitudes. Unfortunately, philosophical and linguistic investigations of expression have historically focused on the intentional communicative behavior of individual agents, leaving the expressive power of groups undertheorized. To fill this lacuna we build on Mitch Green’s theory of “organic meaning,” showing how meaning—and even expression—can emerge from patterns of group behavior or institutional structures that lack communicative intentions.

“Heterodoxy in Divine Explanations of Morality” *Justin Morton (University of California-Davis) and Dan Kemp (Grand Canyon University)*
ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

UNDERGRADUATE AWARD WINNER

“A Commentary on Sex Objects and Sexy Subjects: A Feminist Reclamation of Sexiness” *Maggie Nelson (Auburn University)*
ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

“A Tale of Two Theses: The Good of Others and Stoic Self-Sufficiency” *Allison Piñeros Glasscock (Georgia State University)*

This paper explores two Stoic theses. The first is the Other-Oriented Thesis, which holds that people should cultivate virtue in others. The second is the Self-Sufficiency Thesis, according to which the virtuous person is able to attain everything at which she aims. Both theses are central to Stoicism, but they are in tension. When the Other-Oriented Thesis is combined with Stoic axiology, it entails that the virtue of others must be treated as *good*. Thus, when an agent cultivates another’s goodness, she should do so without reservation. This undermines Self-Sufficiency, since an agent can try—and fail—to cultivate another’s goodness. Appreciating this tension illuminates some otherwise puzzling features of Stoicism.

“On the Truthful Experience of a Friend” *Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock (Georgia State University)*

Defenders of Epistemic Partiality (EP) hold that we should have partial rather than objective beliefs about our friends. A central argument for EP holds that partial belief is required to fulfill our partial practical duties *truthfully* (e.g. we must believe our friend is innocent to defend them truthfully). I argue that both EP and recent attempts to account for its motivations in other terms (such as inquiry or attention) fail to account for truthfulness. To do so, we must recognize that friendship demands that we experience our friends in a certain way (*viz.* to *see* them in a good light).

“The Duty to Avoid Preventable Bad Health” *J. Joseph Porter (DePauw University)*

I argue for a duty to avoid preventable bad health. More precisely, I argue for a pro tanto duty to avoid preventable bad health which is likely to impose significant and foreseeable burdens on others. I take this duty to be part of a more general pro tanto duty of nonmaleficence. The fact that something may impose significant burdens on others is a pro tanto consideration in favor of avoiding it. Plausibly, then, we plausibly have a pro tanto duty to avoid preventable bad health which is likely to impose such burdens.

“Rethinking the Debate between Realists and Anti-realists” *Adam Podlaskowski (Fairmont State University)*

Crispin Wright's Truth and Objectivity provides a widely celebrated reframing of the classic dispute between realists and anti-realists in terms of truth. I argue, though, that Wright reframes this dispute in an irresponsible fashion, instead giving inappropriate dialectic advantages to some positions over others. Ultimately, I suggest an alternative to Wright's approach which still accords truth a central role, but without dismissing positions that challenge the truth-aptness of claims (such as expressivism) or their systematic accuracy (such as error theory). On the proposed alternative, a broader pluralism about meaning is lent more motivation over pluralistic theories of truth

“Hyperintensional Evidence and Bayesian Coherence” *Ted Poston (University of Alabama)*

Bayesian approaches to rationality require that a person's degrees of belief be coherent. Among other implications, coherence requires that a person has the same degree of belief in every logically equivalent proposition. However, a person can have evidence for a claim without having evidence for all its propositional equivalences. This paper explores this conflict and argues that a person may be perfectly rational in virtue of responding to their evidence, even if their credences are not coherent. The paper also challenges the idea that it is always better to have more coherent credences, highlighting the fundamental role that evidence plays in rational belief.

“The Aesthetic Value of Food” *Guy Rohrbaugh (Auburn University)*

ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

Program for the 58th Annual Meeting of the Alabama Philosophical Society

“Social Generics in Context” *Rachel Rudolph (Auburn University)*

Generics about social categories have, rightfully, been subject to serious criticism. Some theorists have even adopted the prohibitionist stance that all social generics should be rejected. Others hold that some social generics are helpful for describing our social world. There is not, however, enough clarity on what makes a social generic problematic or helpful. I argue that to use social generics responsibly, it's not satisfactory to simply reject all of them, or even all of a certain kind; rather, one must pay attention to how they are used against the background of contextual cues, especially the question under discussion in the conversation.

“In Defense of ‘Harmful’ and ‘Dangerous’ Inquiry in Philosophy” *Eric Sampson (Purdue University) and Rebecca Tuvel (Rhodes College)*

Recently, some philosophers have argued that we morally ought to censor academics expressing views about radioactive topics such as what it means to be a woman (Byrne, Stock), the permissibility of consensual adult-child sex (Kershner), and the relation between race and IQ (Cofnas) because such views are “harmful” or “dangerous”. We defend a general theory about the ethical limits of academic inquiry that takes these concerns seriously, but that supports a very permissive view about which ideas should be welcomed in academic spaces. We consider many objections, including the concern that these views are too harmful to marginalized groups.

“Gettier Problems as Intended-Method Failure” *Jordan Scott (Rutgers University)*

ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

“Truth, Justice, and Charitable Interpretation” *Joshua Smith (Central Michigan University)*

ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

Plato, Participatory Arts, and Moral Education *Nick Smith (Alabama A&M University)*

Whether or not certain kinds of video games are “bad for you” has been a topic of popular and academic discussion for several decades. Often, this discussion is centered on the impact of violent video games. While aligning with the current consensus in psychological research is that there is little-to-no direct connection between violent games and perpetrating acts of violence, we consider whether there is some way in which some video games may be bad for you. Using the theater-centered account of moral education found in Plato’s *Laws*, we argue that video games of a certain sort can have a negative impact on your moral development and, thus, can be bad for you.

“Considering Normative Individualism in the Context of Group Silencing” *David Spewak (Marion Military Institute)*

According to normative individualism, individuals are the ultimate moral concern, and groups only matter to the extent that they affect the interests of individuals. Contemporary theories of oppression and structural injustice typically assume normative individualism. However, recent work on silencing and group speech acts has shown that groups can experience silencing. If silencing is a moral wrong, then groups can experience wrongs and are therefore objects of normative concern. This paper argues that we should consider groups as objects of normative concern, rejecting normative individualism.

"Subconscious Inference and Perceptual Justification" *Kaleena Stoddard (Tulane University)*

ABSTRACT NOT SUBMITTED

“Believing Rationally Given Your Actual Beliefs: On Susanna Rinard’s Pragmatism” *Marlon Tinoco (Oklahoma State University)*

In this paper, I challenge David Christensen's objections to Susanna Rinard's theory of belief rationality, according to which the rationality of a belief is solely determined by its usefulness in achieving the agent's goals. After introducing Rinard’s theory, I will introduce Christensen’s cases that allegedly debunk it. Then, I refine Rinard’s theory by arguing that the rationality of an agent's belief can be based on what is best for them given their emotions or perceptual experiences. Lastly, I will contend that this refined version offers a clearer picture of how to assess the rationality of beliefs than Christensen’s analysis.

“Admirably Immoral Inquiry” *Mike Veber (East Carolina University)*

The most common justification for no platforming on university campuses says it is immoral to engage with arguments for certain “problematic” points of view. The conventional response is to deny the immorality. This paper offers an unconventional response. I concede that it is immoral to publicly engage with arguments for problematic conclusions. But, I say, let’s do it anyway. The epistemic mission of the university is to follow the argument where it leads. And that means some moral considerations will be overridden or ignored. This is what makes the university a unique and valuable social institution.