56TH ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE ALABAMA PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY

September 28-29, 2018
Hilton Pensacola Beach Gulf Front
12 Via Luna Drive
Pensacola, Florida 32561

56TH ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE ALABAMA PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY

Keynote Speaker
David Shoemaker
Tulane University

President
Kevin Sharpe
St. Cloud State University

Vice President
Chelsea Haramia
Spring Hill College

Secretary-Treasurer
Thomas Metcalf
Spring Hill College

Web Site
http://alphilsoc.org

Registration
The registration fee of $60.00 is payable at the registration desk near the Coral Reef room between 8:00 A.M. and 12:10 P.M. The fee is also payable to the Secretary-Treasurer, Thomas Metcalf. The registration fee for undergraduates is $10.00.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 28TH, 8:20 A.M. – 12:10 P.M.

Session and Time	Emerald 1	Emerald 2	Aquamarine 1	Aquamarine 2
Session 1 8:20 A.M. – 9:00 A.M.	"Wright's Alethic Pluralism" Daniel Massey Spring Hill College	"An Internal Problem in Schaffer's Argument for Priority Monism in 'The Internal Relatedness of All Things'" Ryan Bond Baylor University	"Believable Errors: Why We Can Believe the Error Theory after All, But Shouldn't" Rhys Borchert University of Arizona	"Why Anselmian Theists Should Reject Modal S5" Thomas Metcalf Spring Hill College
Session 2 9:05 A.M. – 9:45 A.M.	"Quantifiers, Demonstratives, and Compositionality" Geoff Georgi West Virginia University	"Acceptance Cognitivism" Avery Archer George Washington University	"Hope for Others as a Common Project" Aaron Cobb Auburn U. at Montgomery	"This Magic Moment: The Experiential Source of Spiritual Normativity" Drew Chastain Loyola University
Session 3 9:50 A.M. – 10:40 A.M.	"What Empirical Methods in Evolutionary Biology Show about Biological Fitness" Marshall Abrams Univ. of Alabama, Birmingham	~~"Moral Realism and Semantic Accounts of Moral Vagueness"~~ ~~Ali Abasnezhad~~ **Canceled**	"Against Politically Correct Speech" Tully Borland & T. Allan Hillman Ouachita Baptist University and University of South Alabama	"Asymmetry and the Afterlife" Marcus Hunt Tulane University
Session 4 10:45 A.M. - 11:25 A.M.	"Anchoring Human Social Kinds" Aaron Griffith College of William & Mary	"Seemings and Moore's Paradox" Robert Farley Hillsborough Community College	"Borderline Arguments" Chris Dodsworth and Ted Poston Spring Hill College and University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa	"Huayan Quorums and Visions of Unity" Nicholaos Jones University of Alabama, Huntsville
Session 5 11:30 A.M. - 12:10 P.M.	"The Placeholder View of Epistemic Disagreement" Robert Gressis Cal. State U. Northridge	"An Expected Value Solution to the Epistemic Problem for Variabilist Value Holism" Zak Kopeikin University of Colorado, Boulder	"Hume's Theory of Distributive Justice" Ian Cruise U. North Carolina, Chapel Hill	"Can Theists Avoid Epistemological Objections to Moral (and Normative) Realism?" Justin Morton University of California, Davis

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 28TH, 1:30 P.M. – 5:30 P.M.

	Emerald 1	Emerald 2	Aquamarine 1	Aquamarine 2
Session 6 1:30 P.M - 2:10 P.M.	"When is the Imagination Epistemically Useful?" Madeleine Hyde Stockholm University	"Imagining Morality: Alasdair MacIntyre's Virtue Theory and Neil Gaiman's *American Gods*" Sean Hadley Faulkner State University	"Plato, Theodicy, and the Divine Administration of All Things" Morgan Rempel University of Southern Mississippi	***Deep South Philosophy & Neuroscience Workshop*** **12:30p-1:15p** Box lunches & introductions
Session 7 2:20 P.M - 3:00 P.M.	"Can Wide Content Save Intentional Psychology?" Matthew Katz Central Michigan University	"How to Slander (and Otherwise Wrong) the Living after Their Death: An Argument for the Perpetual Moral Standing of the Living" Jason Gray Auburn University	"Jason Brennan on Character-Based Voting: A Critique" Irfan Khawaja Felician University	**S1: Perception, Localization, and Sex** **1:15-1:55p**: Michael Bruno, "Experiencing Real and Apparent Motion" **1:55-2:40p**: Jennifer Mundale, "Why Localization and Cortical Plasticity Don't Conflict" **2:40p-3:20p**: Vanessa Bentley, "A Century of Searching for Sex/Gender Differences in the Human Corpus Callosum"
Session 8 3:10 P.M – 3:50 P.M.	"Dynamical Brain States and the Unity of Experience" Eric LaRock Oakland University	"Aristotle on the Alienation of the Producer from His Product" Samuel Baker University of South Alabama	"Labour Exploitation: A Left-Libertarian Analysis" Roderick Long Auburn University	
Session 9 4:00 P.M – 4:40 P.M.	"Robust Justification" Jonathan Matheson University of North Florida	"Moral Growth as a Transformative Activity in *The Maytrees*" Kristina Grob U. South Carolina, Sumter	"If the Fetus Is a Part of the Mother, Then Three Abortion Defenses Fail" David Hershenov University at Buffalo	**3:20p-3:40p**: Coffee Break **S2: Confirmation and Experiment in Neurobiology** **3:40-4:20p**: Greg Johnson, "Confirmation in Psychology and Neurobiology"
Session 10 4:50 P.M. – 5:30 P.M.	"Animalism and the Brain Intuition" Joungbin Lim Troy University	"Moral Twin Earth Meets the Nazis" Scott Hill Auburn University	"Lies and Hypocrisy: Speech Acts in Ethical Thought and Discourse" Drew Johnson University of Connecticut	**4:20-5:00p**: John Bickle, "Experiment Tools Drive Progress in Neurobiology, and Engineering Drives Tool Development"

Reception: Friday, September 28, 7:30pm-10:00pm; Alabama Philosophical Society Suite; Location TBA

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29TH, 8:00 A.M. – 1:15 P.M.

Session	Ballroom D	Oleander 1	Oleander 2	Ballroom E	Ballroom F
Session 11 8:00 A.M. - 8:40 A.M	"More Thinking about Embedded Metaphor" Brian Pollex University of Texas, Austin	"A Dilemma for Idealizing Reasons Internalism" Eric Sampson U. North Carolina, Chapel Hill	"The Conceptual Coexistence of Realism and Anti-Realism in Being and Time" William Parkhurst U.S.F.	"Hamlet and Plato's *Statesman*" Erich Freiberger Jacksonville University	**S3: Neuroscience, Mood, & Emotions** **9-9:40a**: Mary McGuire, "Mood as More than a Monitor of Energy" **9:40-10:20a**: Josh May, "Reason vs. Emotion in the Brain: A Dubious Dichotomy" **10:20-11a**: Andrea Scarantino, "How to Do Things with Emotional Expressions"
Session 12 8:45 A.M. - 9:25 A.M	"Methodological Deflationism and Semantic Theorizing" Adam Podlaskowski Fairmount State University	"When Is It Ok to Laugh? The Ethical Implications of Derogatory Humor" Andrew Morgan and Ralph DiFranco UA Birmingham and Auburn U.	"Advance Directives and Dementia" David Merli and Benjamin Lin Franklin & Marshall College, Morsani College of Medicine at U.S.F.	"Can We Learn Moral Facts by Observation? A Reply to Kant on Behalf of Aquinas" Caroline Paddock Baylor University	
Session 13 9:30 A.M. – 10:10 A.M.	"How to Deflate the Value of Truth" Chase Wrenn University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa	"Diagnosing Practical Dualism in 'Modern Moral Philosophy'" Rob Reed Texas A&M University	"The Priority of the Good: Liberalism's Perfectionist Architecture" Seena Eftekhari University of Kansas	"Nagel, Reduction, and Non-Formal Conditions" James Simpson Florida State University	**S4: Neurosci., Death, & Pop. Media** **11:15-11:55a**: Michael Nair-Collins, "Homeostasis, the Brain, and Death" **11:55a-12:35p**: Robert Stufflebeam, "On the Glut and Glory of Current Sci-Fi and the Current Fear Regarding Robots, AI, and Practical Immortality"
Session 14 10:15 A.M. – 10:55 A.M.	"Answering Machines and Semantic Tokens" David Spewak Marion Military Institute	"The Last Political Subject: Nietzsche, Genealogy, and Identity" Michael Clifford Mississippi State University	"The Semantic Identity of Indiscernibles" Josh Turkewitz Florida State University	"The Heuristic Model of Justifying Beliefs" Joshua Smith Central Michigan University	**S5: From Dysfunctional Brains to Neuroaesthetics** **2-2:40p**: Patrick Hopkins, "Moral Disease: An Initial Framework for Definition and Classification" **2:40-3:20p**: James Dow, "On the Possibility of a Neuroaesthetics of Natural Environments"
Session 15 11:00 A.M. – 11:40 A.M.	"The Feeling Animal" Alli Thornton & Andrew Bailey U. South Alabama and Yale-NUS College	"Error and Authority in Subjective Theories of Well-Being" Alicia Hall Mississippi State University	"What Should We Do About the Statues?" Benjamin Rossi University of Texas, El Paso	"A Proposition Is Epistemically Possible If and Only If Its Negation Is Not Obvious" Chris Tweedt Christopher Newport University	**S6: Computational Neuroscience** **3:35-4:15p**: Marshall Abrams, "Imprecise Probability in Brain Processes" **4:15-4:55p**: Istvan Berkeley, "Are So-Called 'Artificial Neural Networks' Systems (ANNs) Really Neural?"
Keynote 11:45 A.M. – 1:15 P.M.	"Hurt Feelings" David Shoemaker Ballroom D				

Business Meeting: Saturday, September 29th, 1:30 P.M.- 2:45 P.M. | Location: Flounder's Restaurant

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Saturday, September 29th, 11:45 P.M.- 1:15 P.M.
Location: Ballroom D

Welcome and Introduction
President of the Alabama Philosophical Society
Kevin Sharpe
St. Cloud State University

"Hurt Feelings"
David Shoemaker
Tulane University

Abstract

In introducing the reactive attitudes "of people directly involved in transactions with each other," P.F. Strawson lists "gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings." Because he decided to illustrate his larger points about responsibility by focusing on resentment (via an investigation into its standard excusing and exempting conditions), nearly everyone writing about responsibility in Strawson's wake has done so as well. But what of the remaining reactive attitudes? While many have written about gratitude, forgiveness, and love, hurt feelings is a lonely outlier, with nary a single philosophical paper on it. This puzzling elision is made more puzzling by the fact that, as I intend to argue, considering it carefully has very significant implications for our theorizing about responsibility. Indeed, it may well reveal a stark methodological divide in the field. I will begin by developing a psychologically-informed understanding of the nature of hurt feelings, and then I will explore their excusing and exempting conditions, a la Strawson. To account for them in a theory of responsibility will, as we shall see, require a dramatically different approach than any that have thus far been offered.

PRESENTATION ABSTRACTS FOR THE ALABAMA PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 2018 MEETING

Session 1: Friday, 8:20 A.M. – 9:00 A.M.

Wright's Alethic Pluralism (Emerald 1) Daniel Massey (Spring Hill College)	An Internal Problem in Schaffer's Argument for Priority Monism in 'The Internal Relatedness of All Things' (Emerald 2) Ryan Bond (Baylor University)	Believable Errors: Why We Can Believe the Error Theory after All, But Shouldn't (Aquamarine 1) Rhys Borchert (U. of Arizona)	Why Anselmian Theists Should Reject Modal S5 (Aquamarine 2) Thomas Metcalf (Spring Hill College)
Crispin Wright has long defended a form of alethic pluralism on which there is a plurality of truth properties but a single truth concept. Each domain of discourse has one property that serves as the truth property for that domain while the truth concept is applicable in all domains. I offer an amended form of Wright's view with an eye towards the relationship between the truth concept and the plurality of truth properties. The aim is to resolve problems for Wright's view raised by Douglas Edwards and Michael Lynch.	Jonathan Schaffer (2010b) presents an argument for the thesis that the cosmos is the one and only basic (i.e. not ontologically dependent) concrete object, a thesis he calls 'priority monism'. He argues that a number of theses in metaphysics entail that no concrete objects are freely recombinable, and that this, in turn, entails priority monism. I argue, however, that his motivations for two of his premises in the second half of his argument, viz. premises A3 and A4, are undermined by the first half of his own argument.	Bart Streumer argues for the Error Theory: the theory that all of our normative claims are false. This radical theory seems difficult to believe, and Streumer agrees. In fact, he argues that it is impossible to believe. He thinks that once we recognize this impossibility, many objections to the Error Theory fail, and, consequently, this makes the Error Theory more likely to be correct. I argue that we can believe the Error Theory. Once we recognize this possibility, many objections to the Error Theory succeed, and, consequently, this makes the Error Theory less likely to be correct.	Anselmians have several reasons to reject S5. First, I argue that accepting S5 doesn't win Anselmians anything important, because there is a good objection to common modal ontological arguments beyond rejecting S5 itself. Second, I argue that Anselmians should deny that the modal-accessibility relation R_A is reflexive, because they have reason to affirm a relative of voluntarism about omnipotence, and a certain answer to the Paradox of the Stone. Third, I argue that Anselmian theists should deny that R_A is a symmetric relation, because symmetry would produce a powerful atheological argument.

Session 2: Friday, 9:05 A.M. – 9:45 A.M.

Quantifiers, Demonstratives, and Compositionality (Emerald 1) Geoff Georgi (West VA U.)	**Acceptance Cognitivism** (Emerald 2) Avery Archer (George Washington. U.)	**Hope for Others as a Common Project** (Aquamarine 1) Aaron Cobb (Auburn U. at Montgomery)	**This Magic Moment: The Experiential Source of Spiritual Normativity** (Aquamarine 2) Drew Chastain (Loyola University)
Some philosophers have argued that in virtue of the semantics of quantification, a semantic assignment of propositions to sentences of English relative to contexts cannot be compositional. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake. Compositionality principles governing the semantics of natural language must be consistent with the semantics for demonstratives, but a semantics for quantification that assigns propositions to sentences relative to contexts is consistent with any compositionality principle consistent with a philosophically sound semantics for demonstratives.	According to cognitivism about practical rationality, the means-end coherence norm governing intention may be explained in terms of the closure norm governing belief. One longstanding objection to cognitivism, due to Michael Bratman, is that there are cases in which an agent satisfies the closure norm governing the belief that they will perform a certain action and yet fail to satisfy the means-end coherence norm governing their intention to perform said action. This paper advances a novel version of cognitivism—called acceptance cognitivism—that avoids Bratman's objection.	Hope serves important functions in human life and, as a result, its loss or destruction can be a significant threat to flourishing. In this essay, I contend that caring for the fragile hopes of others is one mark of a virtuous community. Drawing on Robert Adams's account of common projects, I maintain that hoping together for others can contribute to a social ethos in which individuals maintain or recover a well-tuned disposition for hope.	I propose a way of characterizing spirituality and spiritual normativity that relates spirituality to an experience aptly termed the "magic moment." This definitional approach opens up a new way to handle the problem in applied spirituality of correlating patient spirituality with health outcomes. The problem is that current definitions build positivity toward life into the definition of spirituality and fail to plausibly distinguish spiritual from non-spiritual persons. I also challenge a definitional approach that builds value realism into the definition of spirituality. I argue that spirituality doesn't require belief in anything at all beyond what we can experience.

Session 3: Friday, 9:50 A.M. – 10:40 A.M.

What Empirical Methods in Evolutionary Biology Show about Biological Fitness (Emerald 1) Marshall Abrams (UA Birmingham)	~~Moral Realism and Semantic Accounts of Moral Vagueness (Emerald 2) Ali Abasnezhad (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy)~~	Against Politically Correct Speech (Aquamarine 1) Tully Borland (Ouachita Baptist U.) & T. Allan Hillman (U. South AL)	Asymmetry and the Afterlife (Aquamarine 2) Marcus Hunt (Tulane University)
I distinguish between four categories of biological fitness concepts: causal token-organism fitness, causal organism-type fitness, measurable token-organism fitness, and statistical organism-type fitness. I use a case study of empirical research on contemporary human evolution to argue that empirical research in evolutionary biology implicitly assumes the existence of causal organism-type fitness, estimated from statistical organism-type fitness, which is defined in terms of measurable token-organism fitnesses. Causal token-organism fitness plays no role in this research. This picture helps to support the view that philosophers of biology have been mistaken to think that causal token-organism fitness is important to evolution.	**Canceled**.	Any thorough discussion of politically correct speech needs to reckon with the origins of political correctness. So naturally we begin by defining politically correct speech as a particularly leftwing phenomenon. Having defined it, we distinguish between Orwellian and non-Orwellian varieties. We argue that civilly-minded people should reject Orwellian speech. We then turn to so-called hate speech codes and argue against them.	According to David Benatar the transition from non-existence to existence is always a harm, and procreation always wrong. I sketch a non-naturalistic alternative to the empirical premise that procreators move someone from non-existence to existence. Suppose there is an atemporal afterlife. On this supposition, procreators do not move those they procreate from non-existence to existence, and so do not harm them, because anyone who will be freely procreated exists timelessly. Further the less-restrictive criteria "a life worth continuing" is germane for procreators, rather than that of "a life worth starting," since those who will be freely procreated "already" exist.

Session 4: Friday, 10:45 A.M. – 11:25 A.M.

Anchoring Human Social Kinds (Emerald 1) Aaron Griffith (William & Mary)	Seemings and Moore's Paradox (Emerald 2) Robert Farley (Hillsborough CC)	Borderline Arguments (Aquamarine 1) Chris Dodsworth (Spring Hill College) and Ted Poston (UA Tuscaloosa)	Huayan Quorums and Visions of Unity (Aquamarine 2) Nicholaos Jones (UA Huntsville)
Prominent accounts of social facts, e.g., Searle's (2010), explain their	Phenomenal conservatives claim that seemings are *sui generis* mental		

existence and maintenance in terms of collective recognition. But such accounts have trouble explaining the instantiation of kinds like gender and race that are widely believed to be natural categories, but which are actually social kinds. I frame my discussion in terms of Brian Epstein's (2015) notion of 'anchoring': the anchors for a kind are the facts that metaphysically explain or put in place its grounding conditions, i.e., conditions of instantiation. I argue, first, that human social kinds like race and gender are not anchored by facts about collective recognition. I go on to develop an ontology of these kinds on which they are positions in social structures. I propose that what anchors the instantiation conditions for these kinds are facts about the social structures in which they are involved. In the end, I suggest a different role for collectively held (and largely false) beliefs about these kinds, viz. as partial grounds for the social structures that anchors human social kinds.	states. Many of their critics deny this, claiming, instead, that seemings can be reductively analyzed in terms of other kinds of mental states; e.g., beliefs, inclinations to believe, or beliefs about one's evidence. In this essay, I present a novel defense of the view that seemings are *sui generis*. I argue that Moore-paradoxical statements are generated whenever one of the three proposed reductive analyses is substituted for 'seems' in statements like 'The stick is straight, but it does not seem to me that it's straight.' Since the latter statement isn't Moore-paradoxical, the three proposed reductive analyses of 'seems' are unsuccessful. This result supports the view that seemings are *sui generis*.	Does the state have a right to exclude non-criminal persons who wish to become citizens? Advocates of open immigration push for a negative answer. Advocates for restricted immigration pull for a positive answer. The philosophical debate over immigration is both theoretically fascinating requiring a worked-out view of the relationship between a group and individual interest and practically momentous given the number of individuals affected by a state's immigration policies. In this paper we consider Michael Huemer's (2010) moral particularist defense of open immigration and argue that it fails. We argue that both general theoretical reasons from a liberal political philosophy and particular common sense reasons about cases make it plausible that states do have a right to restrict access to their territory. We conclude by arguing that while states plausibly have a right to restrict immigration, the right can be, and often is, defeated by facts about an individual's situation. The upshot is that moral reasons support a selective immigration policy.	The Huayan tradition of medieval Chinese Buddhism offers a hitherto unexplicated account of the unity of wholes, according to which each constituent of a whole is responsible for unifying all of the other constituents of the whole by acting as a common cause for the characteristics and powers of those others. Here I reconstruct the basic structure of the Huayan account of wholes, situate the account among competing strategies for explaining the unity of wholes, and indicate how the Huayan account resolves a certain regress problem meant to challenge the possibility of unity amidst plurality.

Session 5: Friday, 11:30 A.M. – 12:10 P.M.

| The Placeholder View of Epistemic Disagreement (Emerald 1) Robert Gressis (Cal. S.U. Northridge) | An Expected Value Solution to the Epistemic Problem for Variabilist Value Holism (Emerald 2) Zak Kopeikin (U. Colorado, Boulder) | Hume's Theory of Distributive Justice (Aquamarine 1) Ian Cruise (UNC Chapel Hill) | Can Theists Avoid Epistemological Objections to Moral (and Normative) Realism? (Aquamarine 2) Justin Morton (UC Davis) |

In this presentation, I motivate and defend the placeholder view of disagreement. According to the placeholder view, if an epistemic peer disagrees with you, then you should take the bare fact of her disagreement as having some epistemic weight. But once you learn her reasons, then you should not accord her disagreement as having any epistemic weight—only her reasons should have weight. In other words, her opinion has weight, but only because it serves as a placeholder for her real evidence.	Variabilistic value holism, or variabilism, holds that the intrinsic value of some X may be affected by things extrinsic to X. If variabilism is true, then X's intrinsic value may differ depending on extrinsic, contextual features. This paper focuses on a problem for variabilism: variabilism seems to entail that we can't be justified in any of our judgments about intrinsic value. After explaining the apparent problem, I argue that the variabilist has a good response to it. A similar objection has been raised for moral consequentialism. After explaining how these two problems are birds of a feather, I summarize an expected value response to the problem of unforeseeable consequences and then show how the solution applies to variabilism. In total, this paper argues (a) the problem for variabilism is analogous to the problem for consequentialism and (b) expected value offers both consequentialists and variabilists a compelling solution to their problems.	Hume's theory of justice is sometimes thought to be objectionably insensitive to distributive questions. In this paper, I show how, contrary to these appearances, the fundamental structure of Hume's theory makes distributive concerns absolutely central to the realization of justice. Hume emerges as a philosopher whose thought is much friendlier to distributive questions than is often realized. I organize the paper around a challenge to which conventionalists about justice, like Hume, need to respond. As it turns out, answering this challenge requires explaining how Hume's theory addresses distributive questions. The bulk of the paper works towards a Humean response to this challenge.	Many epistemological objections to moral realism allege that realism entails moral skepticism. While it's unclear whether such objections work against non-theistic moral realists, many philosophers seem to think that theistic realists have an obvious escape route: if God exists, there is clearly no epistemological obstacle to moral realism. In this paper, I have two main purposes. First, I want to show that things are not so simple. There is a good case to be made that any plausible theistic reply to these objections begs the question. My second purpose is to show how the theist can plausibly answer this challenge: she can argue that God brought about our moral knowledge without relying on any substantive moral claims of the kind targeted by such objections. I conclude that the theist does have a distinctive—yet surprising!—reply to epistemological objections.

Session 6: Friday, 1:40 P.M. – 2:20 P.M.

When is the Imagination Epistemically Useful? (Emerald 1) Madeleine Hyde (Stockholm University)	**Imagining Morality: Alasdair MacIntyre's Virtue Theory and Neil Gaiman's *American Gods*** (Emerald 2) Sean Hadley (Faulkner State University)	**Plato, Theodicy, and the Divine Administration of All Things** (Aquamarine 1) Morgan Rempel (U. Southern Mississippi)

Our imagination can be put to various uses. I can fantasize, creatively imagine a new object, engage with a work of fiction and even work out what is possible by imagining a given scenario. Kind and Kung argue that two particular uses, however, are incompatible: when we use our imagination transcendentally, to escape reality, and when we use it instructively to discover real-world facts. Why might only some imaginative episodes be able to give us justified true belief, or even knowledge? The key, I shall argue, lies in the aim behind our imaginative project.	Imaginative pictures help explore, in vivid ways, the dilemmas that Virtue Theory has attempted to wrestle. Building upon MacIntyre's understanding of tradition, this paper will propose an understanding of narratives and their moral import on the culture writ large. This phenomenon will be examined through Neil Gaiman's *American Gods*. It is in such imagined realities that the traditions underwriting moral value explode onto the page, making their way into the mind of the reader. Reading fiction becomes an act of moral formation, giving flesh and bones to the "kinds of degeneration" to which the virtues have so often fallen prey.	Ultimately, the question of whether Plato's treatment of the origin and function of evil, combined and his recurring image of a good god concerned with the affairs of humanity, constitutes a true "theodicy", depends upon how one defines the term. This paper maintains that, at the very least, Plato's treatment in the Laws of the divine "administration of all things", and his tale of the universe's formation in the Timaeus, suggests that not only are the matters of evil and the nature of divine involvement in the lives of humankind persistent concerns for Plato, but that he by no means considers them unrelated.

Session 7: Friday, 2:25 P.M. – 3:05 P.M.

Can Wide Content Save Intentional Psychology?	How to Slander (and Otherwise Wrong) the Living After Their Death: An Argument for the Perpetual Moral Standing of the Living	Jason Brennan on Character-Based Voting: A Critique
(Emerald 1)	(Emerald 2)	(Aquamarine 1)
Matthew Katz (Central Michigan U.)	Jason Gray (Auburn University)	Irfan Khawaja (Felician University)
In a series of books and articles spanning several decades, Jerry Fodor argued that a narrow account of concept meaning (i.e., one according to which concept meaning is determined by narrow content such as inferential or functional role) would prove fatal for scientific psychology, and that a correct account of concept meaning must therefore be a wide account (i.e., one according to which concept meaning is determined by wide content such as denotation or informational content). In this paper, I argue that a wide account of concept meaning would also prove fatal for scientific psychology.	Much of the literature about the metaphysics of death is concerned with how the living might be harmed by events after their death. I offer a novel argument defending two thought experiments used to elicit the intuition that a living person may be morally wronged by events that occur postmortem, even if they are not harmed. My argument specifically addresses two kinds of moral wronging: slander and promise-breaking. I believe that our notions of the moral status of a living person ought not change because of their death, and thus the living person may still be wronged.	In his 2011 book, The Ethics of Voting (and elsewhere), Jason Brennan offers a very brief consideration and rejection of "character-based voting" (CBV), which he describes as a paradigm case of "wrongful voting." In this paper, I argue both that Brennan's argument fails, and that the issue is more complicated and more interesting than might be surmised by the short shrift he gives it.

Session 8: Friday, 3:10 P.M. – 3:50 P.M.

Dynamical Brain States and the Unity of Experience (Emerald 1) Eric LaRock (Oakland University)	**Aristotle on the Alienation of the Producer from His Product** (Emerald 2) Samuel Baker (University of South Alabama)	**Labour Exploitation: A Left-Libertarian Analysis** (Aquamarine 1) Roderick Long (Auburn University)
There are over thirty processing sites of the visual cortex alone. Moreover, evidence reveals an asynchronous relation between those processing sites, the temporal gaps of which can be as great as 80 milliseconds. If the properties of color, shape, and motion, for example, are distributed across separate spaces and times, then how is a unified object of experience possible? Wolf Singer proposes that such unity is an emergent property of a dynamical state of the brain. While Singer's proposal has merit, it falls short regarding the unity of experience across cortices of the brain. Finally, I propose a new hypothesis.	According to Aristotle, a producer has a natural love for his product. This is because the producer loves himself and the product reveals in actuality the productive expertise inside of him. Every productive expertise or art (*technē*) is also essentially of a good end (e.g. health) and only accidentally of the opposite (e.g. disease), even though the art can produce both. Consequently, if a producer should use his expertise to produce a product that is not the proper end of his expertise, he will be alienated from that product.	Mainstream libertarians often deny or downplay the existence, and/or the wrongness, of forms of exploitation that do not involve the violation of libertarian rights. I defend an account of exploitation that identifies it as something libertarians qua libertarians have reason to condemn even when no libertarian rights are at stake. I also argue that particular exploiters (e.g., sweatshop owners) are culpable for such exploitation even when they make their workers better off, and even when they are not responsible for the background conditions that make their offers exploitative.

Session 9: Friday, 4:00 P.M. – 4:40 P.M.

Robust Justification	**Moral Growth as a Transformative Activity in _The Maytrees_**	**If the Fetus Is a Part of the Mother, Then Three Abortion Defenses Fail**
(Emerald 1)	(Emerald 2)	(Aquamarine 1)
Jonathan Matheson (U. North Florida)	Kristina Grob (U. South Carolina, Sumter)	David Hershenov (University at Buffalo)
According to evidentialism, a subject is justified in believing a proposition just in case their evidence on balance supports that proposition. Evidentialist justification is a property of fit. However, evidentialism itself is silent as to the status of the relevant body of evidence. In this paper, I propose a different concept of justification, which supplements the evidentialist account with an assessment of the subject's evidence. According to this proposal, to be robustly justified in believing a proposition at a time, the subject's evidence must support that proposition at that time and it must be the result of responsible epistemic inquiry.	I think Agnes Callard's account of transformative activity fits nicely with Concepción and Thorson's discussion of transformative learning: transformative activities transform systematically, requiring the active unlearning of the old and taking on of the new, in ways that can't be (fully) predicted or apprehended beforehand, and possibly according to reasons that don't fit our standard picture of reasons to act. Both together can help to explain Lou's self-transformation in _The Maytrees_ both philosophically and pedagogically, so that Lou seems less like either an unrealistic moral saint or unappealing moral robot and more like a case study exemplifying the difficulty and the beauty of moral excellence.	Many pro-choicers and pro-lifers believe that abortion is easier to defend if the fetus is a part of the mother rather than an entity distinct from her. Ironically, the fetal parthood thesis dooms three defenses of abortion on merely conceptual grounds: fetuses can be terminated on the grounds that they violate their mothers' bodily integrity; fetuses can be killed as they are trespassing on their mothers' bodies; fetuses can be aborted because pregnant women have a right to self-defense. Parts can't trespass on or violate the integrity of the whole and a right of self-defense isn't a claim against oneself.

Session 10: Friday, 4:50 P.M. – 5:30 P.M.

Animalism and the Brain Intuition (Emerald 1) Joungbin Lim (Troy University)	**Moral Twin Earth Meets the Nazis** (Emerald 2) Scott Hill (Auburn University)	**Lies and Hypocrisy: Speech Acts in Ethical Thought and Discourse** (Aquamarine 1) Drew Johnson (University of Connecticut)
Most animalists say that if we are animals, we have entirely biological persistence conditions. So they say that psychological continuity is irrelevant to our identity over time. In this paper, I argue that animalists should reject the biological criterion and instead endorse the 'brain intuition': psychological continuity generated by the brain (or cerebrum) or a cause structurally continuous with it guarantees our identity over time. I show how animalists can solve the remnant person problem by accepting the brain intuition. Finally, I argue that the brain intuition does not lead to the psychological criterion but anti-criterialism.	The Moral Twin Earth Argument is supported by the intuition that the inhabitants of Earth and Twin Earth disagree about morality. Many authors reject this intuition. They claim that the argument requires positing radical differences between Earth and Twin Earth institutions, practices, languages, and psychology. Appreciation of such differences, critics say, undermines the intuition that the Earth and Twin Earth inhabitants disagree. I show that every way in which Earth and Twin Earth must be different is a way in which the Nazis and the Allies actually were different. But such differences do not undermine the intuition that Nazis and Allies disagree. So neither do they undermine the intuition that the inhabitants of Earth and Twin Earth disagree.	There is good reason to think ethical claims are assertions. However, ethical assertion is subject to an additional sincerity condition that does not apply to non-ethical assertion. Generally, asserting makes one lie-prone in virtue of the commitment to truth one takes on in asserting. Additionally, in making an ethical assertion, one is also hypocrisy-prone in virtue of taking on a commitment to act in certain ways. Where liars state that which they do not believe to be true, hypocrites propose a standard for action to which they do not hold themselves. This points the way to a hybrid proposal regarding ethical discourse.

Session 11: Saturday, 8:00 A.M. – 8:40 A.M.

More Thinking about Embedded Metaphor (Ballroom D) Brian Pollex (UT Austin)	**A Dilemma for Idealizing Reasons Internalism** (Oleander 1) Eric Sampson (UNC Chapel Hill)	**The Conceptual Coexistence of Realism and Anti-Realism in Being and Time** (Oleander 2) William Parkhurst (U.S.F.)	**Hamlet and Plato's Statesman** (Ballroom E) Erich Freiberger (Jacksonville U.)
In their paper "Against Metaphorical Meaning" (2010), Lepore and Stone develop and defend a version of non-cognitivism about metaphor. Since many cognitivists about metaphor have argued that the semantic behavior of embedded metaphor provides reason to prefer cognitivism to non-cognitivism, one part of Lepore and Stone's project is a non-cognitivist account of truth for (certain kinds of) sentences containing embedded metaphor. I will offer examples that fail Lepore and Stone's proposed conditions despite seeming intuitively true, and subsequently suggest a different non-cognitivist approach to metaphorical meaning.	One of the longest-lasting debates in ethics concerns a version of the Euthyphro question: are choiceworthy things choiceworthy because agents have certain attitudes toward those things or are they choiceworthy independent of any agent's attitudes? Reasons internalists (e.g., Bernard Williams, Sharon Street, Mark Schroeder) answer in the former way. They think that all an agent's normative reasons for action are explained by facts about her desires. The most popular brand of this view, idealizing internalism, says that an agent's reasons are determined, not by her actual desires, but by what she would desire in idealized conditions. I present a dilemma for this view and argue that it constitutes a significant, but as-yet unnoticed, difficulty for the view.	Heidegger's appropriation of "founded" but not "founding" from Husserl signals a radical anti-realist shift in phenomenology towards an ontology of foundational contextualization ("Fundierungszusammenhänge"). For Husserl, what is 'founded' is necessarily dependent on what is 'founding'. Heidegger's adoption of only one half of this relation is indicative of shift away from traditional conceptions of foundationalism in general. I hold this contextual and holistic approach to the foundationalist problem suggests that he can be neither a realist nor an idealist but instead must take a critical anti-realist approach. Heidegger must deny subject independence and world independence talk of either is meaningless.	Shakespeare's *Hamlet* contains an extensive series of illusions to Plato's Statesman. What is at stake in both the play and the dialogue is the question of how to distinguish kin from kind, true from false, legitimate claims form false claims when the lines of relationship are tangled, confused and blurred by appearances. The political thrust of these questions bears on the question of royal succession that haunted English political life before, during and long after Elizabeth's reign. The play's allusions to Plato appear to have been included both to flatter James and to advance the Scottish succession.

Session 12: Saturday, 8:45 A.M. – 9:25 A.M.

| **Methodological Deflationism and Semantic Theorizing**
(Ballroom D)
Adam Podlaskowski (Fairmount State University)

TBA. | **When Is It Okay to Laugh? The Ethical Implications of Derogatory Humor**
(Oleander 1)
Andrew Morgan (UA Birmingham) and Ralph DiFranco (Auburn U.)

TBA. | **Advance Directives and Dementia**
(Oleander 2)
David Merli (Franklin & Marshall), Benjamin Lin (Morsani College of Medicine at U.S.F.)

We provide two arguments against the authority of advance directives in an important class of dementia cases: those in which patients' current best interests appear to conflict with their past instructions. First, we argue that incompetent moderately demented patients merit respect on grounds of autonomy, using some evidence gathered from patients who have experienced temporary dementia from normal-pressure hydrocephalus. Second, we argue, against Jeff McMahan and Ronald Dworkin, that prudential considerations do not provide a reason for withdrawing treatment in these cases. | **Can We Learn Moral Facts by Observation:? A Reply to Kant on Behalf of Aquinas**
(Ballroom E)
Caroline Paddock (Baylor University)

In this paper, I offer an account of how we can learn moral facts from experience without inference from any general moral principle. The account is based loosely on Aquinas's account of the intimate relationship of beauty and goodness. I will use two of Aquinas's claims about beauty – the metaphysical claim that beauty and goodness are "identical fundamentally" and the epistemological claim that beauty "pleases when seen" – to argue that good acts please when seen and bad acts displease when seen. If this is the case, then the goodness or badness of a human act can be perceived just in the same way that the beauty or ugliness of a human body can be perceived. In both cases, there is no need for inference from general principles. If this account is right, then Kant's famous objection to the possibility of learning morality from observation fails. |

Session 13: Saturday, 9:30 A.M. – 10:10 A.M.

How to Deflate the Value of Truth (Ballroom D) Chase Wrenn (UA Tuscaloosa)	**Diagnosing Practical Dualism in Modern Moral Philosophy** (Oleander 1) Rob Reed (Texas A&M University)	**The Priority of the Good: Liberalism's Perfectionist Architecture** (Oleander 2) Seena Eftekhari (U. Kansas)	**Nagel, Reduction, and Non-Formal Conditions** (Ballroom E) James Simpson (Florida State U.)
Deflationists face the challenge of explaining the value of true belief without treating truth as a substantial property. One strategy for them is moralism, which says truth is valuable only insofar as we morally ought to value truth. This paper examines Paul Horwich's version of moralism, which appears to be committed to an objectionable normative particularism when it comes to truth's value. I argue that the problem with Horwich's proposal stems not from its moralism but from idiosyncratic features of Horwich's view of truth. Other forms of deflationism, such as prosententialism, can explain truth's value better than Horwich's minimalism can.	The purpose of this paper is to explain and defend Anscombe's three theses of 'Modern Moral Philosophy', not by further exegesis of her notoriously dense article, but through illustration. So rather than further scrutinize her particular arguments, I shall simply follow Anscombe's advice and use an adequate philosophical psychology to examine the relationship of modern moral philosophy to premodern moral philosophy. In the process of applying her method and illustrating her claims, I will take the opportunity to refine and further articulate her points and show that the problem of an irresolvable practical dualism connects the three claims.	In his famous book, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Sandel argues that any credible justification of rights must include judgments concerning the moral or intrinsic worth or of the ends that those rights promote. The right is neither prior to nor independent of the good. This is not, he notes, a strictly communitarian approach to political theory; it is instead, he maintains, perfectionist. He cites as an example Aristotle's political theory: before we can establish the ideal society, Aristotle tells us that it is necessary to determine the good life. I want to argue that contemporary liberalism already possesses significant perfectionist strands within its very conceptual and methodological apparatus. Like Aristotle's theory, contemporary liberal theories use a conception of the good to specify the morally relevant properties for citizenship or personhood, which they then employ to determine the structure of the institutions within society.	I will offer, what I will call in this paper, a prima facie problem for Nagel's model of reduction, namely, that it is consistent with any theory being reducible to any inconsistent theory. I will respond to this objection on behalf of Nagel by introducing Nagel's non-formal conditions of reduction. However, I will argue that the last condition—i.e., the reducing theory corrects the reduced theory—of Nagel's non-formal criteria generates a serious worry for Nagelian reduction: either there are no cases of nontrivial reduction or the prima facie problem resurfaces.

Session 14: Saturday, 10:15 A.M. – 10:55 A.M.

Answering Machines and Semantic Tokens (Ballroom D) David Spewak (Marion Military Institute)	The Last Political Subject: Nietzsche, Genealogy, and Identity (Oleander 1) Michael Clifford (Mississippi State U.)	The Semantic Identity of Indiscernibles (Oleander 2) Josh Turkewitz (Florida State U.)	The Heuristic Model of Justifying Beliefs (Ballroom E) Joshua Smith (Central Michigan U.)
Approaches to the answering machine problem often construe the problem as how we should semantically interpret tokens of 'I am not here now'. Cathal O'Madagain proposes an original approach arguing that by restricting semantic tokens to morphological tokens expressing what speakers intend he can provide a plausible conventionalist analysis of semantic tokens while avoiding problems such as the answering machine paradox. I argue that O'Madagain's approach cannot account for outgoing voicemail recordings. O'Madagain's problem arises for the same reason problems arise for alternative approaches: they take the objects of semantic analysis to be expression tokens rather than expression types.	Political theory suffers from an identity crisis. This crisis concerns the identity of the political *subject*. That is, political theory has arguably lacked the kind of critique, or critical methodological apparatus, required to render the crisis of the political subject intelligible, much less to resolve the crisis. Exploring a contrast with Plato's "statesman and with Kant's notion of critique, this paper examines whether a Nietzschean, and more specifically, a genealogical approach to the crises of the political subject can address problems and issues that have confounded more traditional political theory.	I argue that epistemicism is faced with only unpalatable options when confronted by certain fine-grained sorites series in which adjacent objects are indiscernible. To avoid contradiction the epistemicist must say either that adjacent objects in the series do not appear the same as their neighbors or that an undetectable difference in appearance makes a psychological difference to how two objects appear. Both options are implausible. The supervaluationist is more easily able to resolve the difficulty by appealing to extant fundamental aspects of her theory.	This paper investigates the relationship between the practice of justifying a belief and having a justified belief. There are several well–known ways of thinking about this relationship. These are presented, and problems with them are highlighted. Then an older, but overlooked way of thinking about this relationship is presented and weighed against the issues facing the other views. While the overlooked approach fares better, it does face a different kind of concern. The paper concludes by articulating that concern, and possible responses to it.

Session 15: Saturday, 11:00 A.M. – 11:40 A.M.

The Feeling Animal (Ballroom D) Alli Thornton (U. South AL) and Andrew Bailey (Yale-NUS College)	Error and Authority in Subjective Theories of Well-Being (Oleander 1) Alicia Hall (Mississippi State U.)	What Should We Do About the Statues? (Oleander 2) Benjamin Rossi (UT El Paso)	A Proposition Is Epistemically Possible If and Only If Its Negation Is Not Obvious (Ballroom E) Chris Tweedt (Christopher Newport U.)
For good or for ill, we have animal bodies. Through them, we move around, eat and drink, and do many other things besides. But how exactly, do we relate to our animals? Are we parts of them, or they of us? Do we and these living bodies co-inhere or constitute or coincide? Or what? Animalism answers that we are identical to them. In this article, we will present new evidence for animalism. The evidence takes the form of an argument that draws from reflection on our emotions.	Subjective theories of well-being emphasize the authority of the individual over her own well-being. However, people can make troubling mistakes about central aspects of their own well-being. In this paper, I explore how subjective authority can be compatible with extensive error. I argue that, while people may err in specifying what constitutes a prudentially good life, they still have ultimate authority over what these mistakes mean for their well-being and what they should do in response to them. Wisdom and control are distinct types of authority, and subjective theories of well-being need only require the latter.	Recently, a new generation of activists has reinvigorated debate over the symbolic public landscape of Western democracies, and in particular, public representations of historical figures associated with the ongoing oppression of minority groups. In this paper, I consider three proposals for what we ought to do about such representations: remove them from public view, leave them unmodified, or re-contextualize them in some way. Drawing on the work of philosophers and social psychologists, I argue that there are a number of compelling moral reasons not to leave them unmodified, and that the balance of both pragmatic and moral reasons weigh against entirely removing these representations from public view. Re-contextualization, then, is the option I recommend; and while I offer no general rule about how this re-contextualization is to be accomplished, I argue that in at least some cases, anything less than the physical removal of the representation to another space may be an insufficient remedy.	According to the standard account of epistemic possibility, a proposition q is epistemically possible for a subject just in case what the subject knows doesn't obviously entail not-q. I argue, against the standard account, that q is epistemically possible for a subject just in case not-q is not obvious to that subject. The discussion of epistemic possibility has centered on whether CKAs—concessive knowledge attributions—are true; CKAs are statements of the form: 'I know p, but possibly q', where q obviously entails not-p. The account I defend allows some CKAs to be true; the standard view does not. My argument goes like this: proponents of the standard account, *by their own lights*, should endorse the account I propose and think some CKAs can be true.

DEEP SOUTH PHILOSOPHY & NEUROSCIENCE WORKSHOP: ABSTRACTS

(in alphabetical order by presenters' last names)

Imprecise probability in brain processes
Marshall Abrams
Philosophy, University of Alabama, Birmingham
(Session 6)
There are well-known ways of defining various sorts of "imprecise probability", which is mathematically analogous to probability but doesn't assign precise numbers to outcomes. I argue that models that characterize brain processes in terms of probabilities--for example Bayesian models such as Friston's--would more accurately characterize those processes as involving imprecise probabilities, in some cases. I give a general argument for the existence of imprecise chances in nature, and then argue that because of environmental variation and constraints on evolution, natural selection can't produce brain processes that are optimally tuned to environmental conditions. I argue that in many cases the form of suboptimality will involve imprecise chances realized by brain processes, which should be less costly than realizing precise chances.

A century of searching for sex/gender differences in the human corpus callosum
Vanessa Bentley
Philosophy, University of Alabama, Birmingham
(Session 1)
The corpus callosum (CC) is a brain structure that researchers have identified as possibly "sexually dimorphic" and may explain purported differences between men's and women's brain function. Updating the story, I uphold previous findings of no differences (Bishop and Wahlsten 1997; Fausto-Sterling 2000). I identify four ways in which current practice is sex-essentialist. These practices uphold the historical tradition of attributing purported differences between men and women to nature or biology and may be further used to deny women's equality. Thus, the research program is epistemically unsound for ignoring or disregarding evidence that contradicts the preferred view as well as being socially and morally irresponsible for its complicity in the continued oppression of women. I close with some considerations for improved practice using resources from feminist philosophy of science.

Are so-called "Artificial Neural Network" systems (ANNs) really neural?
Istvan S.N. Berkeley
Philosophy Program, Institute for Cognitive Science, and Center for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Louisiana, Lafayette
(Session 6)
So-called Artificial Neural Network systems (ANNs) have been around and been popular for several decades now. It is this technology which lies at the heart of so-called 'Deep Learning' systems which have become an increasingly popularly deployed technology that is used to solve a variety of real world problems. Problems such as pattern and speech recognition systems are now often attacked, with some successes, using deep learning methods. The question still remains over how 'neural' these technologies really are. This talk will address this issue. It will start by considering a well-known and decidedly non-neural aspect of the commonly used backpropagation learning method. However, recent work will then be introduced which suggests that adding neutrally inspired constraints can actually improve the performance of these artificial systems. This talk will conclude with a discussion of the inscrutability problem which remains a serious Achilles' Heel of such systems.

Experiment tools drive progress in neurobiology, and engineering drives tool development
John Bickle
Philosophy, Psychology, and Institute for Imaging and Analytical Technologies, Mississippi State University; Neurobiology, University of Mississippi Medical Center
(Session 2)
Working from case studies of the development of revolutionary experiment tools in neurobiology—gene targeting techniques, optogenetic and chemogenetic technologies, the metal microelectrode, and the patch clamp—I have developed a metascientific model of tool development experiments in the discipline (Bickle 2015, 2016, 2018). One important consequence of my model for contemporary philosophy of science is that in experiment-driven sciences like neurobiology, progress depends almost entirely on the development of new experiment tools. And the development of new experiment tools spurring real revolutions in the discipline, at least those recognized as such by neurobiologists, is driven almost entirely by engineering concerns. "Science-in-practice" approaches have helped to combat the theory-centrism that has dominated the philosophy of science since the field's inception last century. But even these approaches have missed the important role that engineering and applied sciences play in the history and practices of laboratory sciences like neurobiology. In this brief talk I'll introduce these influences with the development of the patch clamp, perhaps the most influential experimental tool behind the "molecular wave" that has dominated mainstream neuroscience for three centuries.

Experiencing real and apparent motion
Michael Bruno
Philosophy, Mississippi State University
(Session 1)
Reflection on experimental research involving apparent motion illusions, and assessments of what the extant results show about the nature and realization of perceptual experiences, has a long and venerable history within contemporary philosophy. Much is now known about the neural basis of these illusory experiences as well as accurate experiences of motion and change. In this talk, I will present and discuss the current state of neuroscientific research and extrapolate lessons for the philosophy of time and time consciousness.

On the possibility of neuroaesthetics of natural environments
James Dow
Philosophy, Hendrix College
(Session 5)
Experiences of nature sometimes involve multisensory engagement, immersion of ourselves in nature, and transformative experiences. Could such aesthetic experiences be described, explained, and predicted by neuroscience? Neuroaesthetics has emerged as a discipline that explains and predicts aesthetic experiences of visual art, music, and literature. Enactivists about perception have argued against the possibility of neuroaesthetics based on the claim that perceptual experience involves sensitivity to sensorimotor contingencies. Engagement theorists about nature aesthetics have argued that engaged aesthetic experiences are non-conceptual, participatory, and action-oriented. Do the enactivist arguments against the possibility of a neuroaesthetics of art provide similar challenges to the possibility of explaining and predicting aesthetic experiences of natural environments? I argue for the counterintuitive thesis that while neuroaesthetics of art can overcome hurdles posed by the enactivists, by appealing to pragmatic representations, the neuroaesthetics of natural environments cannot overcome challenges presented by the action-oriented nature of the aesthetic experience of nature."

Moral disease: An initial framework for definition and classification
Patrick Hopkins
Philosophy, Millsaps College; Psychiatry, University of Mississippi Medical Center
(Session 5)
Numerous studies have suggested that moral cognition is biologically generated and mediated in predictable ways. Assuming that is true and that moral emotions developed over time through an evolutionary process involving adaptation, human moral cognition should be understood as capable of going awry in the same way other cognitive and physiological processes can. As such, moral emotion, perception, and judgment can be subject to disease states. This presentation will present an argument for the concept of moral disease and lay out an initial classification for types of moral disease.

Confirmation in psychology and neurobiology
Greg Johnson
Arts and Sciences, Mississippi State University, Meridian
(Session 2)
Shapiro (2017) argues that confirming psychological explanations indirectly—that is, by using the hypothetico-deductive method or Bayes' rule—is just as warranted as verifying them by examining the underlying neurobiological processes. Indirect methods are also used in neurobiology, of course, but neurobiological processes can, in principle, be directly observed. I will examine some of the procedures used in neurobiology that come the closest to allowing investigators to observe neurobiological processes. While it is true that, at present, it is not possible to directly inspect the neurobiological operation of a cognitive process in primates, it is clear that the direct inspection of those processes (or something very close to direct inspection) will eventually be possible. Since observing how a process operates will provide a greater degree of confirmation than an indirect method of confirmation can provide, progress with these neurobiological techniques gives us a reason to, as a general standard, seek to verify psychological explanations by inspecting the relevant neurobiology.

Reason vs. emotion in the brain: A dubious dichotomy
Josh May
Philosophy, University of Alabama, Birmingham
(Session 3)
Neuroscience appears to challenge the beloved division between reason and emotion. Reasoning, we're learning, isn't always slow, conscious, reliable, or independent of affect. Similarly, despite their usual reputation, emotions can be utterly reliable guides to decision-making that are drawn out over time and rather present in consciousness. However, while the traditional reason/emotion dichotomy is somewhat confused, I'll argue that core debates in philosophy relying on the distinction aren't thereby confused or pseudo-problems. For example, the collapse of the reason/emotion divide is tending to support rationalist, not sentimentalist, views in moral psychology.

Mood as more than a monitor of energy
Mara McGuire
Philosophy, Mississippi State University
(Session 3)
Muk Wong (2016a, 2016b) has recently proposed a theory of mood and mood function on which mood is a mechanism that monitors our mental and physical energy level in relation to environmental energy demands and biases our cognitive processes as a result. The function of mood, then, is to maintain an *equilibrium* between our energy level and the energy demands of our environment. In response, I argue that energy levels are not the only dimension relevant to the elicitation of moods, that Wong's theory fails to explain how different types of moods are elicited across contexts and that mood function cannot be understood in terms of maintaining a balance between our energy and the demands of our environment. In light of these arguments, I draw on appraisal theories of emotion elicitation to propose that we should adopt a multi-dimensional theory of mood elicitation on which moods are elicited by appraisals of objects and events along various dimensions.

Why localization and cortical plasticity don't conflict
Jennifer Mundale
Philosophy and Cognitive Science Program, University of Central Florida
(Session 1)
Cortical plasticity is often taken to be a challenge to functional localization in the brain. In other words, if a given area of the brain is identified with a specific function, and then (perhaps post traumatically), that same region takes on a new function, how is this not in conflict with the localizationist program? In what follows, I argue that, not only is the idea of cortical localization consistent with cortical plasticity, but that localizationist assumptions help to explain cortical plasticity and provide an important heuristic for unmasking its existence and its limits.

Homeostasis, the brain, and death
Michael Nair-Collins
Behavioral Sciences and Social Medicine, Florida State University College of Medicine
(Session 4)
One common explanatory model of homeostasis posits that the organism defends internal stability using a central integrator or controller, which computes error signals by comparing inputs to set points, generating corrective negative feedback. This model plays a key role in the mainstream medical justification for brain death: When the central integrator – the brain – no longer functions, what remains is no longer a physiologically integrated, whole organism, only a collection of artificially supported subsystems. In this talk, I critically evaluate the assumption that homeostasis requires a central integrator, and argue that "brain dead" individuals are biologically living.

How to do things with emotional expressions
Andrea Scarantino
Philosophy and Neuroscience Institute, Georgia State University
(Session 3)
Emotion researchers acknowledge that emotional expressions carry information about various states of affairs. It is also widely recognized that emotional expressions influence their recipients. What has been missing so far is a general framework for the study of (i) what specific information emotional expressions carry, and of (ii) how such information influences the behavior of recipients. In this talk, I summarize my *Theory of Affective Pragmatics*, whose core claim is that emotional expressions make possible four of the basic communicative moves made available by speech acts: expressing, representing, directing and committing. I will describe some experiments I plan on doing in collaboration with psychologists from Germany and Israel to test cross-culturally the basic tenets of the theory.

On the glut and glory of current SciFi and the growth of fear regarding robots, AI and practical immortality
Robert Stufflebeam
Philosophy, University of New Orleans
(Session 5)
Over the last 50 years, TV and movie audiences have seen numerous depictions of artificial intelligence (AI). With few exceptions, AI is almost always presented as something harmful to human life or livelihood. Sometimes this happens as a result of malfunctioning AI (*2001*, *Prometheus*). More commonly, harm to humans results from AI achieving consciousness, which inevitably leads to machine revolts. Either those revolts get crushed (e.g., *Bladerunner*, *I Robot*, *Humans*) or humanity is destroyed by thinking machines (e.g., *Terminator*, *The Matrix*, *Battlestar Galactica*). Little wonder then why Elon Musk and many other people want to halt research into the creation of autonomous AI or robots. What are their fears? Moreover, advances in neuroscience and computer science make depicting practical immortality possible (*Altered Carbon*, *Westworld*, *Humans*, *Get Out*). Is this a good thing? An unprecedented number of TV programs and movies dealing with AI and/or transferring consciousness are now available to watch. Consequently, calls for halting the manufacture of autonomous robots and eliminating AI research are rising. My aim for this talk is to meet those objections by using some recent TV shows and movies to explore certain fundamental questions regarding persons, minds, and machines.

Network causality and distributed realization
Dan Weiskopf
Philosophy and Neuroscience Institute, Georgia State University
(Session 1)
An emerging view in cognitive neuroscience posits that psychological operations are realized by networks of brain regions that are both distributed and interpenetrating, with relatively few operations being realized within specific, spatially circumscribed regions. The causal structure of these networks does not neatly correspond to the causal structure of psychological operations as depicted within our best psychological models. This poses a challenge for interfield modeling, since it is often assumed that a constraint on successful model integration is that the causal structure of the modeled systems should "mesh" appropriately. Several strategies are possible to deal with the failure of different models of the same system to mesh causally. Here I argue that, contrary to what many researchers assume, neural and cognitive models need not mesh, and that both can be correct descriptions of the mind/brain's causal structure. In particular, I argue that the reality of distinct psychological states and operations is consistent with an underlying pattern of overlapping network causality.